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Assessing the risk of pre-existing grievances in non-democracies: The 
conditional effect of natural disasters on repression 
Katharina Pfaff 
Wirtschaftsuniversit€at Wien, Welthandelsplatz 1, 1020, Wien, Austria  
A B S T R A C T   
Every disaster carries the risk of destruction but not every disaster prompts violent political process in a country. This article examines the popular argument that 
natural disasters can lead to higher state violence if resulting shocks caused by a disaster add to pre-existing grievances. If economic inequality or political instability 
is prevalent before a disaster occurs, disasters are expected to exacerbate the perceived threat to government’s survival in office. Consequently, repression is expected 
to be higher in the aftermath of a disaster. I test the existence of the expected conditional effect of pre-disaster stability and disasters using cross-national data on 
natural rapid-onset disasters in non-democracies between 1976 and 2013. As indicators for pre-existing grievances this article focuses on ex ante economic inequality 
and political dissent. While a natural disaster as such is not associated with a violation of human rights, empirical evidence suggests that the probability of an increase 
in post-disaster repression is higher when a country has previously experienced grievances.   
1. Introduction 
Natural disasters are most commonly linked with a disruptive impact 
on infrastructure and economies. In 2014, more than 141 million people 
were affected by natural hazards and 20 808 fatalities as well as a total 
damage of approximately US $ 98 billions have been recorded by the 
International Disaster Database [1].1 Due to its destructive potential, a 
natural disaster can trigger various social and political processes in a 
country - especially in non-democratic countries. If disasters constitute 
profound economic shocks and add new grievances to preceding 
dissatisfaction, governments are prone to resort to repression in order to 
quiet (potential) political opponents.2 Yet, increasingly violating basic 
human rights of political opponents in the aftermath of a disaster does 
not belong to the standard response of governments. Similar to Ton et al. 
[2], who add to the understanding of disaster risk for vulnerable in-
dividuals, this article takes a closer look at the economic and political 
determinants affecting the risk of post-disaster repression in 
non-democracies. 
In line with previous literature, I argue that disasters - especially 
those affecting a large number of the population - reduce available re-
sources of a government and can provoke repression. However, I do not 
propose that every large-scale disaster prompts state violence. Rather 
the intuition is that marginalized people, who are already aggrieved, are 
mobilized by the additional inequality created by the damages due to 
the disaster. I hypothesize that the effect of disasters on repression is a 
function of the size of the disaster and that it is conditional on preceding 
economic inequality and political instability measured by previous 
protest activity. This repressive response is expected to hold for non- 
democratic countries. 
The argumentation builds upon previous studies, which find that 
resource scarcity caused by natural disasters can increase grievances and 
competition for resources and spark social conflict (e.g., Refs. [3–8]). 
With disasters exacerbating existing grievances and inequalities [9–12] 
and grievances providing a focal point for mobilization and protest 
against the government [5,13–15], non-democratic incumbents are ex-
pected to respond to this threat by increasing repression (e.g., Refs. 
[16–18]). This paper thus examines whether the likelihood of an in-
crease in repression in the aftermath of a disaster is larger under 
pre-existing grievances. 
I test for the existence of such conditional effects using information 
on up to 871 natural disasters, different levels of economic inequality, 
and protest covering repression in the period between 1976 and 2013 for 
E-mail address: katharina.pfaff@wu.ac.at.   
1 In this article, the terms ‘natural hazard’ and ‘natural disaster’ are used interchangeably to denote natural exogenous hazards, which affect at least a part of the 
population. This does not imply that outcome of a natural event should be considered as ‘natural’. In contrast, the extent of an event is likely to be a function of 
capacity and willingness of a state. See, for instance, O’Keefe et al. [69]; Gould et al. [70]; Berrebi and Ostwald [41]:384, or Plümper et al. [82]:50 for a detailed 
argumentation regarding the term ‘natural disaster’.  
2 For instance, Gutmann et al. [71] provide empirical evidence for the link between economic shocks and repression. The authors find that respect for physical 
integrity rights decreases after banking crises; this negative effect is more pronounced in autocracies. 
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up to 112 non-democracies. Empirical results of the ordered probit 
estimation provide empirical support of the theoretical considerations. 
Natural disasters as such are not associated with a higher probability of 
an increase in repression. Yet, the predicted probability of an increase in 
post-disaster repression is larger when political situation of the country 
has been unstable or if economic inequality increased in the previous 
period. This effect is statistically significant and robust to an alternative 
definition of non-democracies. 
While the link between climate and political instability has sparked a 
vivid discussion among researchers (e.g. Refs. [4,6,19]), only few 
studies examine the implications of disaster-related shocks for basic 
human rights. These studies have in common that a repressive response 
is assumed to depend on pre-existing grievances, which are fostered in 
the onset of disaster-caused resource scarcity [10,20,21]. Yet, some 
authors find that repression increases after disasters [10,20], whereas 
others do not find a causal impact on basic human rights [21]. This 
paper offers a resolution of this tension by explicitly testing whether a 
disaster’s impact is conditional on previous grievances presented by 
economic inequality or the expression of political dissent. 
2. Disasters and repression 
Existing literature on the effect of disasters largely draws on political- 
economic theories of exogenous shocks (e.g. Refs. [22–24]), which 
model an increase in repression as an outcome of negative income 
shocks. With a constrained government’s budget and a limited financial 
ability to provide rewards to voters and special interest groups, political 
support of the autocratic government within the entire population 
suddenly drops [24]. Due to the negative income shock buying political 
support of the population becomes more expensive. Facing increasingly 
scarce resources in the aftermath of disasters, grievances can accumulate 
to dissent (e.g. Ref. [5]). To counteract a decline in political support and 
stability governments resort to the relatively cheaper option, which 
often is repressing potential challengers of the government. 
The relevance of disaster-caused economic grievances is in detail 
described by Besley and Pearson [20]. In their empirical analysis, the 
authors find that exogenous shocks reducing the availability of public 
goods and resources rents are associated with an increased probability of 
political violence. However, this effect only occurs for natural disasters 
occurring in non-cohesive institutions as the use of political violence is 
inhibited in the presence of higher constraints in the executive. While 
the argumentation put forward is very detailed and convincing, more 
refined measures of the key variables could shed more light into the 
empirical analysis of the disaster-repression nexus. First, measuring 
natural disasters as the number or the simple occurrence of rapid-onset 
disasters does not account for the strength of a disaster. Although the 
many disasters per year can of course put enormous strains on resources, 
the government is also likely to be overwhelmed and resort to repression 
if a larger share of its key supporters is affected [25]. Second, when 
conceptualizing repression as the presence of one-sided violence a lot of 
information and consequently variance over time and between countries 
is lost. This can be captured when using more encompassing repression 
data. 
Similar to Besley and Pearson [20], a study by Wood and Wright [10] 
shows that post-disaster repression in a democratic government differs 
from non-democracies. As expected, higher levels of institutional de-
mocracy go in hand with lower levels of repression. The provision of 
additional resources in the form of disaster aid decreases repression in 
disaster-struck democracies as opposed to non-democracies. Their main 
argumentation is in line with previous work: natural disasters are seen as 
events, which cause a negative income shock. Due to their adverse effect 
on both private wealth and public infrastructure, disasters are assumed 
to be a trigger facilitating mobilization for the expression of existing 
grievances ([10]:7). Provoked by this resource scarcity, increased 
repression is thus a governmental tool to hold on to power. 
Last but not least, based on a principal component analysis Gutmann 
and Voigt [21] put forward that only emancipatory rights experience a 
clear deterioration as a consequence of natural disasters. Comparing pre- 
and post-disaster first-differenced levels of human rights protection, the 
authors find stable results when controlling for the level of income and 
democracy. For respect for basic human rights, which is similar to 
commonly used measures of state repression, evidence also suggests a 
significant deterioration in the aftermath of natural disasters. However, 
the authors are careful in proposing a causal link between disasters and 
basic human rights as they find a negative trend in human rights pro-
tection already before a disaster takes place ([21]:12). It thus remains 
uncertain whether disasters constitute a shock, which leads a govern-
ment to repress opponents. 
Against the backdrop of these studies, it becomes clear that not every 
disaster destabilizes a government and leads to a change in repression.3 
Constraints on resorting to repression matter: repression is more likely in 
non-democracies (e.g. Refs. [26–28]) and in countries, in which it is 
easier to rely on a constitutional emergency provision during a natural 
disaster [29].4 It also matters to what extent a disaster strains a gov-
ernment’s resources meaning that the size of the disaster as an indicator 
for potential disaster-induced grievances is crucial as well. Finally, it has 
theoretically been suggested that the initial, pre-disaster situation mat-
ters and that repression is related to pre-existing grievances. 
While the political and social pre-disaster setting of a non-democracy 
is one of the baseline assumptions for post-disaster repression, this 
assumption has not explicitly been scrutinized. In other words, previous 
literature provides no empirical evidence whether repression is in fact 
conditional on these factors. The lack of accounting for a conditional 
effect may explain why previous findings are contradictory. Focusing on 
the conditional effect of pre-disaster inequality, instability, and the size 
of disasters, this article intends to close this gap. 
3. The conditional effect of disasters on repression 
This section seeks to identify the conditional effect, which de-
termines whether a natural disaster triggers an increase in political 
repression. It is based on the above-mentioned theoretical frameworks 
laying down a government’s response to exogenous shocks. Emanating 
from this literature, the theoretical contribution lies in the argument 
that the destabilizing effect of a large disaster on a government is 
stronger the larger the ex ante economic inequality and political insta-
bility. In other words, the expected effect depends on pre-disaster 
discrimination of the population and tensions. The main reason is that 
competition for resources in the aftermath of disasters is higher in the 
light of pre-existing social tensions. In this case, the threat to the in-
cumbency of the government is heightened which is expected to increase 
the use of repression in the aftermath of a disaster. 
In this theory, I distinguish between three main actors: the govern-
ment, the elite, and the population. A government is driven by the aim of 
maintaining political power and increase time in office. To decrease the 
risk of being deposed, the government invests its available resources in 
buying political support and by means of repressive coercion [24]. Both 
the elite and the broader population trade their political support of the 
incumbent government for the provision of private goods and public 
goods with the aim of maximizing their utility. A minimum support of 
both the elite and the broader population is needed to remain in office. 
Despite this similarity, the main difference lies in their relative political 
importance to the survival of the government. 
While demands of both groups have to be met to remain in power, 
3 The current article is primarily interested in the link between natural events 
and repression. For detailed information on the relationship between climate 
change and violence, please consider the review provided by Theisen [72].  
4 This argument builds upon previous research discussing the state practice of 
derogating from human rights treaties during a state of emergency, for instance, 
Neumayer, Bjørnskov and Voigt [73,74]; or Sommario [75]. 
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the allocation of resources to the elite and the broader population is 
chosen in line with the relative influence of these groups. The govern-
ment allocates available resources for private and public goods either 
such that both groups benefit equally or such that it discriminates 
against the broader population in favour of the elite. Governments in 
more democratic countries generally allocate resources to the benefit of 
a large share of the population, e.g. in the form of public goods during 
and after a disaster [30,31]. This is rational as disaster relief in response 
to natural disasters is positively associated with electoral support (e.g., 
Refs. [32–34]). Thus, countries with better institutions such as de-
mocracies are associated with better risk governance (e.g., Ref. [35]). 
Autocracies, in contrast, predominantly spent resources on private 
goods, which benefit a smaller share of the population as this is “good 
politics” to enhance survival in office [36,37]. The less democratic a 
regime is the more private benefits are selectively allocated to the elite 
in the form of private rents to gain its support. This implies that the 
government will shelter the elite from the negative effects of the disaster 
as opposed to the broader population. Ignoring the demands of a rele-
vant group leads to a decrease in political support and could lead 
members of the relevant group to mount a challenge to the political 
leadership of the government. 
A natural disaster results - depending on the severity of the event - in 
a significant destruction of private wealth and public infrastructure. In 
this paper, disaster severity is indicated by the number of the affected 
population. The more people are affected, the higher the severity of a 
disaster. While the occurrence of disaster is not in the hands of politi-
cians, the way of responding to a disaster or a disaster risk is ([37]:821). 
New needs of the affected elite and the affected broader population 
reduce a government’s financial scope for handing out rents and public 
goods to the unaffected part of the elite and broader population. One 
common way to address the rebuilding of infrastructure and the provi-
sion of assistance to the affected population is the re-allocation of 
budgetary resources. Although a moderate level of altruism and support 
of government intervention can be assumed, the unaffected population 
typically bears the cost of financial transfers - either in the form of higher 
taxes, debt, or the opening up of domestic markets for reasons of food 
provision [31]. In addition, the affected population may perceive the 
impact of a natural disaster as an indicator of government failure and 
decrease their support of the government, which could lead to the 
replacement of the government [37,38]. The impact of a disaster thus 
makes buying political support more expensive so that the government 
has to determine the degree to which it intends to assist or react. 
On the one hand, the government can decide not to respond to the 
disaster. This can lead to the loss of support of the affected population 
and the unaffected altruistic population who disapproves of this lack of 
assistance. Yet, minor natural events put less stress on the economy and 
are less likely to strain the economic situation. Thus, there is only little 
competition for resources between the groups of the population pro-
voked by a disaster. The government will not assist the relatively small 
number of individuals affected by the disaster as more political support 
would be lost than gained if the government became active and re- 
allocated resources. This claim is supported by Cavallo et al. [25] who 
- in contrast to large natural disasters - do not find evidence of a sig-
nificant impact of milder events on economic growth. 
On the other hand, the government may need to respond. The larger 
the share of the relevant affected population, the more political support 
would be lost if the government remained inactive. Disaster assistance 
can be provided either equally in the form of quasi-public goods, which 
benefit both the broader population and the elite, or unequally in the 
form of targeted transfers to selected individuals affected by the natural 
disaster [31]. Quite intuitively, more resources have to be spent the 
larger the impact of the disaster. Resources spent on mitigating the ef-
fects of a disaster for the affected population reflect economic costs to 
the unaffected population reducing their political support for the 
incumbent. The government, which wants to remain in office, decides 
for the resource allocation which is likely to yield the maximum support 
from the population and to deter opponents from challenging the 
regime. 
Facing potentially high costs of assistance and the need to deal with 
increased grievances of the disaster-struck population, a non-democratic 
government is likely to decide to repress more in the aftermath of a 
disaster [10]. The larger the pre-disaster discrimination against the 
broader population in favour of the elite, the larger the frustration of the 
marginalized group and social tensions if this discrimination is 
increased. This is likely to happen in the aftermath of a disaster. Di-
sasters can exacerbate existing tensions as they increase competition for 
scarce resources [10]. Because of an indirect effect on shortages, 
resource competition, and food price volatility disasters can increase the 
frustration of a marginalized individual [5,15]. The common experience 
of an emergency situation can strengthen solidarity and cooperation 
among individuals, who are affected, as an immediate response (e.g., 
Ref. [39]) but also go beyond the emergency situation. Marginalized 
individuals, which share this frustration, may then unite, overcome the 
collective action problem, and mobilize against the government [13,14]. 
Such positive association between natural events, scarce resources, and 
social conflict events like protest or riots has been found in several 
studies [3–8]. Facing a regime challenge, autocratic governments are 
likely to respond to this threat by increasing repression [16–18]. 
At the same time, state capacity is reduced in the onset of disasters. 
The government’s ability to suppress rebellions in the aftermath of di-
sasters is likely to be reduced due to the destruction of infrastructure 
relevant for national security, transportation, or communication [5]. 
Resources and personnel have to be re-allocated from other areas such as 
security to investments in reconstruction and relief [40]. The govern-
ment’s capacity to monitor the population, control the region, and 
provide security in disaster-affected regions can suffer [41]. A possible 
loss of government control can result in the incapacity to prevent citi-
zens from assembling. It reduces the threat and potential cost for the 
population associated with mobilization and participation at protests 
[42]. This leads to a short-term fluctuation in de facto political power 
and incentivizes the opportunity for mobilization. 
Both of the aforementioned factors can open a window of opportu-
nity for challenging the government (see Ref. [43]) and can increase the 
government’s perception of threat. Remaining inactive could incur 
removal from office due to a loss of political support. However, 
addressing large inequality and instability is costly. Constraints to the 
use of repression are comparatively lower in autocracies. The higher the 
costs of buying political support relative to the costs of repression, the 
more attractive an increase in repression to ward off challengers. In line 
with previous studies, this leads to the following hypothesis:  
(1) The larger the share of the population affected by the disaster, the 
higher post-disaster repression. 
Assuming that resource scarcity and competition provokes repres-
sion, two factors can intensify a government’s response to a disaster: pre- 
existing economic inequality and preceding political dissent. Disasters 
lead to resource scarcity, which can reinforce existing scarcity among 
individuals. If previous economic inequality and instability have been 
low, there is little pre-existing grievance and disasters are less likely to 
act as a catalyst for mobilization. Consequently, there is little additional 
threat to the incumbency of the government. In the case of a pre-existing 
unstable situation, however, disasters can exacerbate existing inequality 
and incentivize mobilization, which makes repression more attractive 
for an autocratic government. 
Unequal treatment is likely to persist in the aftermath of a disaster 
and likely to widen the gap between the population and the elite needed 
to secure survival in office. Marginalized individuals, which experience 
political or economic inequality, are not only more vulnerable to di-
sasters but also less likely to receive government resources in the 
aftermath of a disaster ([9]:28). In a cross-country panel data analysis, 
Yamamura [11] finds that natural disasters widen income inequality in 
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the short-term. This finding is supported by evidence from Kenya, where 
Kenyan high-income households have been found to be more likely to 
receive food aid than low-income households [12]. With vulnerable 
groups being disadvantaged in recovery efforts, this worsening asym-
metry in the distribution of scarce resources can additionally destabilize 
a government ([44]:155; [5]). In other words, disasters can exacerbate 
previously held dissatisfaction due to marginalization and create an 
opportunity for challenging the regime [5,44–46]. Situation of resource 
scarcity are thus more likely to turn violent in the light of political 
dissent or inequality [47]. 
In the scenario of pre-existing grievances, the government would 
thus have to invest more resources to fend off challengers from the 
broader population. Yet, the government loses relevant political support 
when relocating resources to the affected population and not to the elite 
as providing public goods to the population does not increase an auto-
cratic leader’s survival in office. This is a trade-off as relocating all 
available resources away from the affected population to the affected 
elite is also likely to increase the population’s incentives to challenge the 
government given pre-existing tension. Hence, the government is ex-
pected to react with more widespread repression to prevent challenges 
from both the elite and the broader population. 
To sum up, the theoretical framework suggests that the coercive 
response of a government is conditional on ex ante economic inequality 
and political instability. Adding resource scarcity to prevalent resource 
constraints promotes an increase in repression as it exacerbates the 
severity of a threat to government’s survival in office. These expecta-
tions can be summarized as follows: 
(2) Repression is higher in the aftermath of a disaster when the po-
litical situation has previously been unstable.  
(3) Preceding economic inequality reinforces the effect of disasters 
on repression. 
4. Research design 
To explore the conditional effect of natural disasters on repression, I 
use a panel data set in which the unit of analysis is country-year. Given 
that the theoretical section of this paper describes expected repressive 
responses to disasters in non-democratic countries, the sample used for 
the empirical analysis does not include democracies. As opposed to non- 
democratic countries, democratic governments are more likely to sus-
tain political support through their expenses on public goods and less so 
by violating physical integrity rights.5 Following the commonly used 
cut-off, a regime is considered as a non-democracy if its level of de-
mocracy, i.e. its polity2 value [48], is below 6. For this reason and data 
availability described below the sample used for regression analysis 
consists of up to 111 non-democratic countries over the period from 
1976 to 2013. The sample includes 871 natural disasters of different 
severity. 
4.1. Dependent variable 
Repression measures encompass respect for freedom from political 
and unlawful imprisonment, freedom from torture and beatings as well 
as freedom from cruel and inhumane treatment. Also, the concept of 
repression captures violations in terms of extrajudicial killings and 
forced disappearances. The variable is taken from the Political Terror 
Scale (PTS; [49]) which codes human rights information from reports by 
the US Department of State. The variable is coded as a five-point scale 
with higher values indicating more widespread violation of physical 
integrity rights. The following example illustrates the interpretation of 
the repression variable: In February 1976, Guatemala experienced a 
massive earthquake with a magnitude of 7.5 on the Richter scale. In 
1976, a repression score of 4, respectively, was noted down for the 
country which means that “civil and political rights violations have 
expanded to large numbers of the population” ([50]:4). In this sample, 
the average score is at approximately 3, meaning that violations are 
common and political imprisonment is extensive (ibid.). 
4.2. Independent variables 
The main independent variable measures disaster severity. While 
disasters can also be measured in terms of intensity, e.g. using wind 
speed or Richter scale of magnitude [51], this paper is interested in the 
impact of a disaster as perceived by the population, i.e. the number of 
people affected by a disaster. This information is available from the 
Emergency Events Database EM-DAT of the Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters for data [52]. This dataset is based on ob-
servations and reports compiled from various sources such as UN 
agencies, insurance companies, or the International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies. It includes events which result in at 
least ten or more deaths, 2000 affected for droughts and famines or 100 
for other disasters, declaration of a state of emergency, or plea for in-
ternational assistance. 
As a government may adapt to disasters, which slowly evolve over 
time, the focus of this paper lies on rapid-onset natural disasters. This 
excludes epidemics, droughts, insect and complex disasters. Based on 
the above mentioned definition of non-democracies the sample used for 
analysis counts up to 871 rapid-onset disasters. While on average 1 
million people were affected by disasters per year, the disaster with the 
highest impact occurred 1998 in China where more than 238 973 in-
dividuals were affected by a flood. As the theoretical section suggests 
that the adverse effect increases with the severity of disasters in a 
country, the main independent variable affected is used.6 This variable is 
divided by 1000 to facilitate readability in estimation tables. As it can be 
expected that a disaster exerts a stronger impact in countries with a 
smaller population size, I add the logarithm of the total population. 
Population data is available from World Bank [54]. 
The main independent variables are economic inequality and polit-
ical instability. To measure economic inequality, I use data on the GINI 
coefficient as a measure of income inequality which is a normalized 
measure between 0 and 100. Higher levels indicate a more unequal 
distribution of net income. Data are available from the World Devel-
opment Indicators [54]. As the second part of theoretical framework 
sketches an immediate impact of disasters conditional pre-existing 
conditions, I include a one-period lag of GINI to account for this tem-
poral dependence. Accounting for prior dissent is important as already 
mobilized groups may incite more repression than groups which yet 
have to overcome the collective action problem. As a measure of 
pre-existing political instability, I thus include anti-government protests 
as a binary dummy variable indicating whether at least one protest has 
occurred in the last year [53]. Also, I control for the presence of protest 
and armed civil conflict leading to at least twenty-five battle-related 
deaths in a year. This data is taken from the Armed Conflict data set 
provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the Peace Research 
Institute Oslo [55]. 
As the argument assumes that natural disasters constitute a negative 
income shock to the economy, which reduces available resources for 
buying political support, I account for cross-country differences in eco-
nomic capabilities. I thus include the logarithm of per capita GDP in 
constant US$ to capture a country’s financial capacity to respond to 
5 Similarly, research has noted that a population in democracies expresses its 
grievances in a more peaceful way using, for instance, elections as a forum to 
punish or reward elected officials instead of contentious actions [33,76–78]. 
6 While disaster severity can be endogenous to institutional of political fac-
tors, the number of people affected by natural events presents a more reliable 
estimate than other available indicators such as the number of individuals killed 
during a disaster. See also Wood and Wright [10] for a similar argumentation. 
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rapid-onset disasters. This data is available from the World Development 
Indicators [54]. In order to capture whether the presence of humani-
tarian aid mitigated or even intensified a regime’s repressive response to 
a disaster, disaster aid as a percentage of GDP is included as a control 
variable.7 This variable is taken from the AidData 3.0 dataset [56,81] as 
this dataset is, firstly, more encompassing as for instance aid data from 
the OECD. Secondly, it is more detailed than alternative datasets as it 
identifies a purpose for each activity from 1947 until 2013. For this 
analysis, disaster aid encompasses only those activities labeled as 
emergency assistance such as emergency health services and food aid, 
reconstruction relief, relief coordination, and material assistance and 
rehabilitation.8 A detailed description of summary statistics of these 
variables is provided in Table 1. 
4.3. Estimation 
As the dependent variable repression is ordinal on a five-point scale 
an ordered probit model is used to test the above stated hypotheses. As 
the inclusion of regional dummies in an ordered probit model can pro-
vide inconsistent estimates (e.g., Ref. [57]) and leave standard errors 
questionable, I refrain from using country-fixed effects. To account for 
within unit correlation, I cluster standard errors by country. In addition, 
I include three temporal splines as they allow controlling for unobserved 
time-varying heterogeneity [58]. As opposed to the inclusion of a lagged 
dependent variable or a Prais-Winsten (AR1) transformation, which 
implicitly assume that the variable has the same dynamic function, a 
model with splines can capture possible heterogeneous effects of shocks 
and trends caused by a disaster [58,59]. In combination with time 
dummies, which take the value 1 if a disaster occurred in the current 
year (dummy0) or in the previous 1–3 years (dummy1 - dummy3, 
respectively), the baseline models in the following analysis accounts 
both for how disaster prone an area has been in the recent years and the 
temporal dynamics of disasters. 
5. Empirical results 
Table 2 depicts the baseline regression results of all models testing 
hypothesis 1, i.e. whether a larger share of the population affected by a 
disaster can be associated with higher levels of repression in the same 
year. As indicated by the non-significant coefficient of the population 
affected by a disaster, the size of the population affected by a rapid-onset 
disaster does not seem to have a substantial effect on repression in the 
short run. Other control variables are as expected: the presence of 
dissent events such as protest or conflict is associated with higher levels 
of repression. Although the theoretical expectation is that larger di-
sasters lead to higher resource constraints and thus are more likely to 
prompt repression, the non-significant estimate provides little support 
for the hypothesis of an unconditional effect of disasters. This finding is 
in line with Gutmann and Voigt [21] and also Wood and Wright [10] 
who find an increase in repression for the full sample but not if only 
non-democracies are considered. When looking at the temporal dummy 
variables in this sample of autocracies, however, estimates suggest that 
the occurrence of a disaster in the current or the previous year(s) is 
associated with lower levels of repression. This implies that the shock of 
a natural disaster on repression may not be as expected but can persists 
at least up to 3 years after a disaster. 
Table 3 presents estimation results for the empirical models which 
explicitly account for pre-existing grievances in the form of political 
instability and economic inequality. More specifically, these specifica-
tions attempt to capture the conditional effect of natural disasters on 
repression. Model 1 in Table 3 presents the results for the interaction 
effect of pre-existing political instability and disaster strength, i.e. 
testing hypothesis 2.9 As expected by theory, the effect is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. However, the inclusion of the 
lagged inequality measure reduces the number of observations and 
countries in the sample considerably to 94 observations and 20 coun-
tries, respectively. To increase parameter certainty by increasing sample 
size, model 2 in Table 3 therefore only includes the current value for 
economic inequality, which results in a larger sample of 70 countries. 
Although this alternation reduces the level of significance is slightly 
reduced to the 10% level, the conditional effect of pre-existing protest 
and in the onset of disaster fatalities is still positive. The same holds for 
hypothesis 3, namely the conditional effect of pre-existing economic 
inequality and disaster fatalities. All else equal, the interaction effect is 
Table 1 
Summary statistics.  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Repression 1958 3.05 0.99 1 5 
Affected 1958 15.30 139.86 0 2549 
Fatalities 1958 0.44 6.65 0 222.641 
GINI 288 39.52 8.44 16.23 60.79 
Protest 1958 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Civil conflict 1958 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Cold war 1958 0.31 0.46 0 1 
GDP per capita (ln) 1958 7.10 1.01 4.75 11.03 
Aid (% of GDP) 1958 13.62 3.23 4.14 25.10 
Population (ln) 1958 16.20 1.47 12.57 21.03  
Table 2 
Ordered probit estimates of the effect of disasters on repression.   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Affected   0.000134   0.000148   0.000169   0.000177 
(0.000188) (0.000189) (0.000193) (0.000194) 
Protest 0.272*** 0.276*** 0.276*** 0.276*** 
(0.0796) (0.0802) (0.0794) (0.0794) 
Civil conflict 1.480*** 1.478*** 1.481*** 1.485*** 
(0.126) (0.125) (0.126) (0.127) 
Disaster aid (%) 0.123*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 
(0.0240) (0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0236) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.217*** 0.219*** 0.214*** 0.210** 
(0.0836) (0.0831) (0.0831) (0.0829) 
Population (ln) 0.302*** 0.315*** 0.320*** 0.322*** 
(0.0431) (0.0430) (0.0434) (0.0436) 
Cold war 0.0388 0.0301 0.0320 0.0162 
(0.174) (0.172) (0.173) (0.174) 
Dummy0   0.0781    
(0.0798)    
Dummy1    0.158**    
(0.0787)   
Dummy2     0.191**    
(0.0895)  
Dummy3      0.232**    
(0.0996) 
Number of observations 1958 1950 1950 1950 
Number of countries 112 112 112 112 
Wald χ2 380.59*** 396.29*** 385.03*** 384.79*** 
Pseudo R2 0.2045 0.2058 0.2064 0.2071 
Notes: All models include temporal splines. Robust standard errors clustered by 
country are indicated in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
7 As Nunn and Qian [79] find that aid from the US is associated with an 
increase in civil conflict in aid-receiving countries, I run a separate regression 
excluding US-aid. Empirical findings remain unaffected by this specification 
and thus not further discussed below.  
8 More specifically, aid activities bearing the following purpose codes are 
included: 70000, 72000, 72010, 72020, 72040, 72050, and 73010. 
9 As the coefficients for the interaction effects are robust to variations in time 
dummies, i.e. dummy0 to dummy3, only results including a dummy variable for 
the disaster year is included. 
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positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. These signs of these 
coefficients of interest are as expected, namely positive, suggesting that 
pre-existing grievances in the form of political protests and economic 
inequality prompt an increase in repression as the toll of affected per-
sons increases. 
To illustrate these conditional relationships, marginal effects are 
presented in Figs. 1 and 2 since coefficients of interaction terms cannot 
be interpreted directly [60]. Fig. 1 shows the marginal effect of the 
number of affected people being conditional on protest as calculated in 
model 2 from Table 3. Examining this conditional effect more closely, it 
becomes obvious that this effect is statistically significant for the ma-
jority of disasters in the sample. In the light of pre-existing political 
instability, the probability of an increase in the repression score from a 
repression score of 2–3 is higher when more people are affected by a 
disaster.10 For example, in the aftermath of disasters, which affected 
approximately 150 000 persons, the probability of an increase in 
repression lies at about 50%. This disaster strength is comparable to the 
losses suffered in countries such as the Philippines, which experienced 
several high-impact typhoons in 2012. For very small and very large 
disasters, there is no statistical significant effect on the probability that 
the repression score increases. This is not surprising as minor natural 
event would only incur minor resource constraints and tensions. Apo-
daca [9] notes that in the light of extreme disasters the population is 
more concerned about surviving and may consequently not present a 
credible threat to the government.11 Thus in some cases, large disasters - 
such as the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004–may even present an op-
portunity for conflict-struck societies (e.g., Le Billon et al. [40]) and 
Kelman0 [61] for a more detailed discussion on disaster diplomacy 
opportunities). 
Fig. 2 depicts the marginal effects of the interaction term in model 3 
from Table 3, i.e. it illustrates the predicted effect of an increase in 
preceding economic inequality by 1% at different numbers of people 
affected from natural disasters. In line with theoretical expectations, the 
probability of an increase in the repression score from 2 to 3 is higher 
when more people are affected by a disaster. With disasters affecting 
approximately 150 000 persons, the probability of an increase in 
repression lies at about 2%. Interestingly, data also reflect a pattern 
which suggests a turning point: the conditional effect is positive and 
increases up until a total of 575 000 individuals affected and decreases 
thereafter. Again, it has to be noted that this sum of people affected from 
natural events is very rare which is likely to be reflected by the greater 
uncertainty of coefficients as indicated by the spread of the confidence 
interval. In sum, results yield empirical support in line with both con-
ditional effect hypotheses. 
6. Robustness checks and discussion 
Several changes in the research design are conducted to ensure the 
robustness of the previous findings: an alternative indicator for identi-
fying non-democracies and restrictions to the measure of disaster 
strength and political instability. While previous findings remain 
Table 3 
Ordered probit estimates of the conditional effect of disasters on repression.   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Affected   0.00813   0.0164**   0.0217*** 
(0.00617) (0.00689) (0.00486) 
Protest (t)   0.0319 0.289* 0.154 
(0.289) (0.164) (0.203) 
Protest (t-1)   0.193   0.333* 0.269 
(0.291) (0.178) (0.164) 
Affected x Protest (t-1) 0.0219*** 0.0159**  
(0.00764) (0.00689)  
GINI (t)   0.0898* 0.00604  
(0.0470) (0.0124)  
GINI (t-1) 0.0636  0.0163 
(0.0500)  (0.0113) 
Affected x GINI (t-1)   0.000480***   
(0.000117) 
Disaster aid (%) 0.133 0.172*** 0.203*** 
(0.122) (0.0511) (0.0474) 
GDP per capita (ln)   0.0231 0.211 0.388*** 
(0.237) (0.154) (0.133) 
Population (ln) 0.812*** 0.429*** 0.396*** 
(0.303) (0.0875) (0.0802) 
Civil conflict 0.812 1.453*** 1.335*** 
(0.596) (0.264) (0.240) 
Cold war   10.14*** 0.597 0.123 
(3.698) (0.552) (0.580) 
Dummy0 0.501 0.283   0.0326 
(0.349) (0.177) (0.151) 
Number of observations 94 288 279 
Number of countries 20 70 71 
Wald χ2 1409.18*** 189.05*** 161.99*** 
Pseudo R2 0.3599 0.2260 0.2231 
Notes: All models include temporal splines. Robust standard errors clustered by 
country are indicated in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
Fig. 1. The conditional effect of disaster and protest on repression.  
Fig. 2. The conditional effect of disaster and economic inequality 
on repression. 
10 As the sample mean of repression lies between 2 and 3, the predicted effect 
of the interaction in Figs. 1 and 2 only depicts the probability of observing an 
outcome of category of 3.  
11 This non-significant effect applies to 14 country-years in this sample, in 
which more than 1 124 000 people were affected by disasters. 
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unaltered with an alternative decision criterion for the sample, disasters 
exert a positive effect on human rights protection when the focus lies on 
the number of fatalities. Pre-existing grievances at a stronger level are 
not associated with a post-disaster increase in repression. All regression 
tables of the following robustness checks are reported in the appendix. 
The theory focuses on non-democracies as only these regime types 
are expected to react with the theorized repressive response. Yet, the 
polity2 indicator classifies countries according to constraints on the 
executive, which implicitly may contain elements of physical integrity 
rights. To check whether this could drive the null finding, I use a regime 
category variable available from Bjørnskov and Rode [62]. This variable 
follows the democracy-and-dictatorship data from Cheibub et al. [63], 
which considers a regime to be (non-)democratic if elections were (not) 
conducted or not free and fair. Also, a country is considered as 
non-democratic if there was a non-peaceful turnover following those 
elections. Following this stricter definition, the number of observations 
is marginally reduced from 1958 to 1903 for the baseline regression, but 
from 94 to 80 in Table A2. Except for the model based on this largely 
reduced sample size, the main findings remain unaltered. There is no 
unconditional effect and still strong empirical support for both condi-
tional effects in model 2 and model 3 (see Tables A1 and A2 in the 
appendix). 
Also, the main independent variable Affected is replaced taking ac-
count for the vagueness of the definition of “being affected” by a 
disaster. According to the EM-DAT glossary, a person is counted as 
“affected” if he or she requires immediate assistance in the aftermath of 
a disaster. This is a very broad conceptualization, which is likely to 
provide an imprecise estimate of the effect of disasters.12 Therefore, I re- 
run the regression analysis above using the number of disaster fatalities 
assuming that it is a more accurate proxy for disaster severity. The sign 
of the unconditional effect of disaster fatalities is negative and statisti-
cally significant suggesting an increase in respect for physical integrity 
rights (see model 1 in Table A3). In contrast to previous results, neither 
the conditional effect for pre-existing instability nor pre-existing 
inequality is statistically significant (see model 2 and 3 in Table A3 in 
the appendix). These findings follow an intuitive logic: if more potential 
political opponents are killed by a disaster, repression can be lower 
without the threat of losing office. An improvement in human rights 
outcomes could also be attributed to naming and shaming in press re-
ports and by Amnesty International [64]. 
Public protests are the most likely but not only possible way in which 
the population can express their dissent against the government. Pre- 
existing grievances are also likely to be present if the population de-
cides to riot or mobilizes for a revolution. Similar to information on 
protests, data on the occurrence of riots and revolutions is taken from 
Banks [53]. Table A4 in the appendix, however, shows no empirical 
support for an unconditional effect in the light of riots or revolutions. 
This may be attributed to regional characteristics and the fact that it is 
more costly to mobilize a sufficient share of the population for a riot or a 
large-scale revolution, whereas protests are easier to organize. While 
protest also occur in rural areas, riots and revolutions are more likely to 
occur in urban areas. Raleigh et al. [15] suggest that, for instance, re-
actions to increased price volatility are more pronounced in urban areas. 
This is intuitive as not all regions suffer equally from a disaster [65]. 
Future research using geo-coded data on the exact location of dissent 
events, the economic structure of regions or districts, and the occurrence 
of disasters is thus more likely to catch up on these dynamics than 
analysis at the country-year level. 
With respect to future research avenues, it is also worth mentioning 
that there are possible reasons why human rights could deteriorate not 
in the same year but in the years after a disaster occurred. Often, the 
affected population and activists have experienced repressive measures 
at protests against failure of emergency relief programmes or during 
their investigations on the government’s response to the disaster which 
sometimes took place in the year following the disaster (e.g. Ref. [66]).13 
In fact, empirical evidence finds support for a deterioration of such basic 
human rights a year after a disaster [21]. A common modeling choice for 
examining the effects of variables, which “persist into the future” 
([67]:189), is to include a lagged dependent variable. Yet, research 
suggests that this cure can be worse than the disease of incorrectly 
modeling temporal dynamics (e.g., Refs. [59,68]). It is thus worth 
looking more into temporal scenarios of post-disaster repression, 
possibly with a particular focus on the effectiveness of rebuilding 
programmes. 
7. Conclusion 
A disaster strains resources and the affected population. A disaster in 
a situation, in which nerves are already on edge, does not only put 
additional pressure on resources but also challenges the government to 
respond. In response to political opposition, non-democracies often 
resort to repressive measures. In this article, I have analyzed a popular 
but so far un-tested theoretical claim: natural disasters add new griev-
ances to existing ones. Responding against the backdrop of pre-existing, 
intensified risk, a government’s reaction is not only prompted but likely 
to be intensified in the aftermath of a disaster due to concerns for its 
political survival. This was assessed looking at the conditional effect of 
disasters and two correlates of grievance: anti-government protests and 
economic inequality. 
Empirical estimations lend support to the theoretical considerations 
presented in this article. While there is no unconditional effect, i.e. di-
sasters as such not being followed by an increase in repression, pre-
ceding political dissent and economic inequality can foster an increase 
in repression. The effect of economic inequality, however, is not very 
substantial, which is intuitive as grievances do not necessarily lead to 
political dissent. So as expected not every disaster incentivizes a leader 
so engage in repressive activities. If at all, it is rather the size of the 
disaster and the stability of the country, in which the disaster occurs, 
that matter. These findings suggest that post-disaster strategies should 
need to include the protection of human rights, especially in a country 
neglecting pre-existing grievances. Also, results provide some empirical 
support for the substantial importance of disaster relief and long-term 
investment in economic development with respect to post-disaster repres-
sion. It should be noted, however, that the positive effect of reduced 
economic inequality on other human rights may be stronger. 
The focus of this article was to examine relationship between a rapid- 
onset disaster and repression while accounting for preceding inequality 
and instability. According to this setting, the effect of the disaster should 
be visible in the same period as the disaster occurs. Yet, as highlighted in 
the discussion of this article, the analysis of temporal dynamics as well 
as potential peace-promoting opportunities remain important avenues 
for future research in the field of disaster risk reduction. 
12 See Neumayer and Plümper [80] for a detailed criticism of the accuracy of 
disaster variables provided by EM-DAT. 
13 At the anniversary of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake repression, especially in 
the form of unlawful detention and beatings, increased preventing activists 
from giving evidence at trials ([66]:287f). 
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Ordered probit estimates of the unconditional effect of disasters   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Affected   0.000223   0.000231   0.000250   0.000258 
(0.000174) (0.000174) (0.000176) (0.000177) 
Protest 0.316*** 0.315*** 0.317*** 0.319*** 
(0.0829) (0.0837) (0.0828) (0.0830) 
Civil conflict 1.442*** 1.436*** 1.440*** 1.444*** 
(0.124) (0.125) (0.126) (0.126) 
Disaster aid (%) 0.115*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 
(0.0230) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0225) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.182** 0.185** 0.181** 0.177** 
(0.0841) (0.0833) (0.0828) (0.0827) 
Population (ln) 0.328*** 0.334*** 0.341*** 0.343*** 
(0.0438) (0.0434) (0.0431) (0.0428) 
Cold war   0.0263   0.0447   0.0376   0.0472 
(0.180) (0.178) (0.179) (0.179) 
Dummy0   0.0913 (0.0861)    
Dummy1    0.116 (0.0857)   
Dummy2     0.174* (0.0934)  
Dummy3      0.214** (0.103) 
Number of observations 1903 1896 1896 1896 
Number of countries 110 110 110 110 
Wald χ2 425.25*** 431.73*** 430.56*** 430.00*** 
Pseudo R2 0.2175 0.2179 0.2189 0.2195 
Notes: All models include temporal splines. Robust standard errors clustered by country are indicated in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.  
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Table A2 
Ordered probit estimates of the conditional effect of disasters on repression. 
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Table A3 
Ordered probit estimates of the effect of disaster fatalities on repression. 
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Table A4 
Ordered probit estimates of the conditional effect of riots and revolutions. 
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